In the introduction to their provocative new monograph, Carlin Barton and Daniel Boyarin describe the volume as an effort "to do the 'impossible' work of making an incommensurable thought world comprehensible without resorting to the pre-sorted categories produced in the scholar's study" (6). Put simply, they want scholars of the ancient world to cease translating the words religio and thre\ skeia as "religion." They argue that using the word "religion" to classify certain practices and ideas as parts within a common whole is to graft distinctly modern associations and abstractions onto a set of far more nuanced, polyphonic, and socially embedded ancient concepts. While Barton and Boyarin stress that ancient writers thought extensively about gods, built temples, conducted rituals, etc., they are adamant, quoting Daniel Dubuisson, that these authors did not make "from this collection of attitudes and ideas an autonomous singular complex" (5). Their contention is that the word "religion" is simply too loaded, too misleading, too institutional, and too laden with Christian connotations to be usefully applied to the ancient world.
The details of their argument take shape over twelve chapters, which are arranged into two sections. The first concerns the Latin religio and culminates in a detailed discussion of the term in the writings of Tertullian, while the second analyzes the Greek thre\ skeia and focuses on Josephus's oeuvre. We begin in the Roman Republic where religio demarcated "a range of emotions arising from heightened attention: hesitation, caution, anxiety, fear" (19). In this context, religio had nothing to do with cult or cultic practices; rather it served as a psychological restraint against transgressive behavior. It was only with Cicero that the gods became part and parcel of religio. In Cicero's writings, the gods were the authors and enforcers of religio, who, in that capacity, punished lawbreakers and rewarded loyal citizens accordingly. As fear of the gods, religio was a means of achieving social order. Religio was about the production of a collective consciousness. Building off this Ciceronian innovation, Tertullian developed an understanding of religio through the framework of disciplina. Whereas religio acted as a restraint, disciplina denoted both restraint and active engagement, the cultivation of volitional behaviors and practices. With Tertullian, the authors propose, "one can see the origin of a nation of religio as occupying a distinct, separate (and privileged) dimension of life that could exist within and still be distinguished from the government of the Empire" (111).
In the thre\ skeia section of the book, the authors adumbrate that the term, across the writings of Plutarch, Herodotus, Strabo, Philo, 4 Maccabees, and the New Testament, had two distinct albeit related senses. It demarcated the excessive, frenzied practices of others (thre\ skeia as deisidaimonia), while also denoting "our practices" (thre\ skeia as eusebeia) (134). That is to say, the word designated cultic activity in both a positive and negative sense. From there, Barton and Boyarin turn to Josephus who, they argue, sagaciously deployed both meanings of the word, in a move they call "Josephan double-speak." The authors demonstrate how he used the double-valence of thre\ skeia to convey to Judeans and Romans respectively what he thought they wanted to hear about Judean customs and habits. In this reading, Josephus emerges as a much nimbler and shrewder verbal tactician.
Barton and Boyarin explicitly acknowledge that Imagine No Religion is an amplification of Brent Nongbri's Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). And although I strongly agree with Barton and Boyarin that scholars of antiquity have been far too uncritical and imprecise in their usage of the word "religion," I find myself less persuaded that the way forward is to abandon the term altogether. At its core, the study of the past is an exercise in explanatory translation. Methodical investigation of the past requires us to be self-conscious about the limits, deficiencies, and misrepresentations of modern terminology. Thus, it seems to me that the problem with translating the words religio and thre\ skeia as "religion" is not the translation itself, but rather that too few of us take the next step to say exactly what we mean when we use the word. Jonathan Z. Smith famously wrote (in an essay the authors quote in the introduction) that the problem with religion is not that it is impossible to define, but rather it can be defined countless different ways.
It is striking, indeed, that even as Barton and Boyarin acknowledge contemporary debates about the term "religion," they nonetheless treat the word (in its modern guise) as a static and monolithic category. Throughout the book, they suggest that this connotative inflexibility is precisely why "religion" is such a problematic rendering of religio and thre\ skeia. But why is it that these ancient words are characterized by a polyphony of meanings and implications, but the modern word "religion" is not? Barton and Boyarin never, in fact, provide their own definition of "religion"-they never enumerate the foundational contours of one half of their comparative exercise. There is a wide range of pre-existing approaches to the critical use of the term "religion" that Barton and Boyarin do not discuss in the beginning of the book, which places enormous weight on the writings of Smith and Timothy Fitzgerald. One thinks of the work of Bruce Lincoln, Kevin Schillbrack, Stanley Stowers, David Frankfurter, Benson Saler, and Robert Segal, among others, who have made arguments about "religion" that are grounded in comparativism, critical realism, polythetic classification, phenomenology, and morphology. Why are these approaches less valid than abandoning the word altogether? In glossing over these myriad approaches to theorizing religion, Barton and Boyarin have offered an asymmetrical diagnosis of the problem they seek to correct.
These criticisms should not, however, detract from the momentum that Imagine No Religion brings to ongoing conversations about religion as an analytical category in the ancient world. Barton and Boyarin have written a book that demands to be read widely and studied carefully. Their argument must be taken seriously, and we will all be better for it. A story about a boy who barges in on his father's dinner party wearing a new golden earring sounds more like the plot of an after school special than a sophisticated literary text. But saints' lives are weird, and it is the odd details that distinguish one hagiography from the next. In this case, it is the boy's piercingnot an anointed forehead or a white alb-that visibly manifests his baptism and conversion to Christianity. The emphasis on the earring turns what would otherwise be a generic and forgettable story into the memorable account of a Jewish shepherd boy who becomes the "Slave of Christ."
The tale, impeccably translated from the original Syriac by Aaron Butts and Simcha Gross, unfolds in the late fourth century in the northern Mesopotamian city of Shigar, "while Magianism was still flourishing in the land of the Persians" (88). Eleven-year-old Asher ben Levi is the caretaker of one of his father's flocks. Every day, he encounters a number of other boys at the local watering hole who are similarly tasked with their own fathers' animals. While the beasts drink, the boys eat. Christians break bread with Christians, Magians with Magians, but
